Currency manipulation and international trade


American-made products can compete anywhere in the world within a free market. But when countries manipulate currencies and unfairly lower the cost of their exports, markets are distorted in three significant ways, damaging the U. Skip to main content. Why Is Currency Important to Trade? Because trade happens through the exchange of money, currency can be as important an influence on trade as the qualities of the traded goods or services themselves. When governments intervene in currency markets to subsidize their exports, they violate the principles of free trade and force the market to ignore normal pressures of supply and demand.

Free trade supports U. Government intervention in currency markets distorts trade flows and undermines free trade agreements. Based on IMF principles, a three-part test can be used to clearly identify a currency manipulator within existing or future trade agreements: Did Country X have more exports than imports an account surplus over a set six-month period?

In a recent paper Staiger and Sykes , we offer three reasons for caution regarding the claims that have been made by the economic commentators and the proposed countermeasures under discussion in the political arena. The translation of currency practices into equivalent trade policies is straightforward in the long run when all prices are fully flexible.

As is well known, currency market intervention has no real effects in that environment due to the long-run neutrality of money — prices in a country that devalues its currency will adjust so that the real effects of the devaluation and implied price changes cancel out, leaving import and export volumes unchanged. Nevertheless, a devaluation in this environment is equivalent to the imposition of a tariff on all imports and a subsidy to all exports.

Just as with the devaluation, the tariff-cum-subsidy policy leads to price adjustments that cancel each other out and leave import and export volumes unchanged an implication of Lerner symmetry. Two specific points follow. First, exchange rate intervention need not imply real trade effects. Second, the oft-heard claim that devaluations or the prevention of appreciations are equivalent to the imposition of a tariff-cum-subsidy is not by itself sufficient to establish a case for WTO- or WTO-consistent- action against such currency interventions.

From the long-run perspective considered here, the equivalence does exist, yet no action in response to the currency intervention is warranted. In the short run, with sticky prices, a devaluation will have real effects, but these effects — and hence translation of a devaluation into trade policy equivalents — depend importantly on how internationally traded goods are priced. Moreover, the impact of trade policies such as tariffs in a sticky-price environment can be quite different from the impact of tariffs in the long run, which adds a further layer of complications in assessing whether exchange market intervention can be said to upset the WTO bargain.

For example, suppose that all producers invoice goods in their domestic currency. Competitive producers will set their prices such that their returns from sales are the same regardless of where they occur the law of one price holds.

Now imagine that the Chinese government undertakes measures that produce an unanticipated devaluation during the period when producer prices are sticky. The price of exports to China rises in yuan, and the price of Chinese exports falls measured in units of foreign currency. The ratio of the price of exports to China relative to the price of Chinese exports thus rises in any common currency, inducing some expenditure switching between them. In this case, the equivalence between a devaluation and a tariff-cum-subsidy continues to hold, just as in the long run flexible price environment.

Yet the effects of the tariff-cum-subsidy in this case differ importantly from the long-run effects that trade policies are ordinarily thought to have. There is no inefficient wedge driven between prices in the two markets as would be the case with a conventional import tariff. And from the perspective of countries exporting to China, the terms of trade improve, an effect that would by itself generate a welfare gain for the nations exporting to China and that runs counter to the usual effect associated with internationally inefficient trade policy intervention.

Alternatively, suppose that producers set their export prices in the currency of their foreign customers, while setting their domestic prices in their home currency. Initially, those prices are also set such that the returns expected from sales in each market are the same.

Assume once again that these prices are sticky in the face of an unanticipated devaluation by China. Firms exporting to China now earn fewer units of domestic currency on their Chinese sales, while Chinese exporters now earn more yuan on their export sales. Here, the ratio of prices in each currency remains the same as before the devaluation and there is no expenditure switching, but the terms of trade improve for China.

In this case the devaluation is equivalent to an import tariff alone: The effects of the tariff in this case will also differ from their ordinary effects, as there are now no expenditure-switching effects between Chinese goods and other goods. But such policies taken together would cancel each other out in the long run and have no real effects.

Thus, they could not impair the WTO bargain in the long run. Exchange rates International trade. China , renminbi , Currency manipulation , yuan undervaluation. A caution Robert Staiger, Alan Sykes 30 January Many critics argue that Chinese currency undervaluation amounts to an export subsidy and import tariff responsible for global trade imbalances.

Equivalence between a devaluation and a tariff-cum-subsidy need not imply that a devaluation warrants WTO action The translation of currency practices into equivalent trade policies is straightforward in the long run when all prices are fully flexible.